


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# STAFF NOTES:

## Soviet Union Eastern Europe

State Dept. review completed

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## SOVIET UNION · EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Moscow Monitors the Berlin Election Returns


Both *Pravda* and *Izvestia* have expressed dismay over the results of the West Berlin election earlier this week. The *Pravda* article, referring to the almost 6-percent gain by the CDU, says that "these results can not but call forth serious concern in democratic societies. It should not be forgotten that during the course of the campaign the CDU whipped up nationalist and revanchist feelings and subjected basic provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement to attack."

Both articles take solace from the fact that the SPD/FDP coalition will continue to govern the city, providing a continuity of policy, and that the election campaign turned primarily on internal questions. Soviet concern nevertheless, shows through, not only because of possible effects in Berlin itself, but also because the results may indicate a trend in the FRG. The economic conditions that the Soviets cite as one reason for the election outcome have a parallel elsewhere in West Germany.



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The articles acknowledge that the Lorenz kidnapping affected the campaign. *Pravda* asserts that "the action of the leftist extremists played into the hands of reaction." This persistent theme of Soviet commentary has implications for Soviet and local Communist party policies in countries such as Portugal.



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**SECRET**Firyubin in Indochina

The Soviets have sent Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin to Indochina, apparently to get a first-hand reading of the situation. Firyubin, whose responsibilities include Southeast Asia, arrived in Laos on March 5 after an unannounced visit to North Vietnam.

The trip seems to have been hastily arranged. The Lao government and the Soviet embassy in Vientiane did not know he was coming until the last moment. Neither Moscow nor Hanoi has revealed that Firyubin and his small party of Indochina experts from the Foreign Ministry have been in North Vietnam.

Firyubin is going to see Souvanna Phouma and the Lao Communist leaders while he is in Laos. But the circumstantial evidence, including negotiations between the Soviet embassy and the Laotians on a statement to be issued following the visit, strongly indicates that the Laos stopover is not the essential reason for Firyubin's presence in Southeast Asia.

The last high-ranking Soviet visitor in Hanoi was Army Chief of Staff Kulikov, who was there in December, ostensibly for the celebrations of the North Vietnam army anniversary. Presumably Kulikov sounded out the North Vietnamese regarding their military intentions in South Vietnam during this dry season. Firyubin almost certainly covered some of the same ground as Kulikov, particularly in view of signs that Hanoi is readying a new phase of its dry season campaign in South Vietnam. In addition, the Cambodia problem--which did not loom so large in December--was almost certainly high on the deputy foreign minister's agenda.

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In addition to getting a better appreciation of the situation on the ground and of how Hanoi and the Khmer Communists see it developing in the coming weeks, Firyubin may have sought to get Moscow in a position where it could have some influence in the event of a complete Communist victory in Cambodia.

Until recently the Soviets were openly urging negotiations and stating that a military solution in Cambodia was not possible. Now they find themselves in the embarrassing position of having diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol government, very weak ties with the Khmer Communists, and little inclination or prospect of working with Sihanouk, who has been dependent on Peking.

Moscow presumably wants to establish closer ties to the Khmer Communists. The Soviets have given favorable play to the statement recently put out by the Khmer Communists at their second congress, which expressed the desire for good relations with all sides. Moscow probably thinks that the Khmer Communists, and Hanoi as well, would have some interest in getting more active Soviet support following the termination of hostilities. Firyubin may have also cautioned the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Communists to avoid punitive actions in Cambodia that would evoke a sharp public reaction in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

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Moscow Rolls Out Red Carpet  
for Guinea-Bissau Delegation

A high-ranking delegation from Guinea-Bissau concluded a six-day visit in Moscow on February 25. The visit was full of effusive mutual pledges of friendship and support. The Soviets were at pains to make clear their hope that the relationship established with Bissau's ruling party during its struggle for independence from Portugal would continue now that the freedom fighters have become national leaders.

The Bissau delegation met with Kosygin and CPSU candidate Politburo member Ponomarev. The talks resulted in the signing of economic, trade, scientific, technical and cultural assistance programs and in an agreement to establish a Soviet trade mission in Bissau.

Nothing was said openly about military assistance, but with the Bissau deputy chief of general staff in the delegation the matter was certainly on the agenda. Moscow provided military assistance during the guerrilla war, and since independence the Soviets have given Guinea-Bissau small arms ammunition, and some aircraft, and possibly MI-8 helicopters. The Bissau delegation probably made a pitch for more arms, although with independence achieved their needs are modest. The Soviets' reluctance to go deep in their own pockets to keep the Bissauns happy may be lessened if the Soviets have some notion of eventually getting the use of the Cape Verde Islands.

In the communique issued on February 27, the agreement which will grant independence to the Cape Verde Islands on July 5, 1975 was singled out as an important step in the decolonization process.

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The islands have a potential strategic value for Moscow should its relations with Guinea go sour. The Soviets have periodically flown reconnaissance missions over the Atlantic from Conakry.

The Guinea-Bissau government has repeatedly said that it will follow a policy of nonalignment in conducting its foreign affairs, and it has maintained its ties with the West. The Soviets nevertheless have the inside track. Moscow is the only major capital visited so far by the Bissauns and, in contrast to their sometimes feckless behavior elsewhere in Africa, the Soviets have made good on their promises of aid to the Bissauns.

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Portuguese Chief of Staff  
Lauds Romanian Example

Portuguese Army Chief of Staff General Carlos Fabiao evidently was greatly impressed by Romania during a visit to Bucharest last week. Fabiao was the guest of Colonel General Coman, his Romanian counterpart, who arranged for Fabiao to talk with Defense Minister Ionita and President Ceausescu.

[redacted] the general went to Bucharest in an effort to outflank leftist elements in the Armed Forces Movement who are pressing hard to move the Portuguese military establishment away from its current Western orientation and toward nonalignment. In the context of this anti-bloc outlook, Fabiao could argue that Romania's reluctant participation in the Warsaw Pact and the absence of foreign troops from Romanian soil provided a model for Portugal's future ties to NATO.

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Fabiao waxed eloquent about the Romanians, and called for closer relations with Bucharest in a press interview upon his return to Lisbon. Indeed, his remarks suggest that the Romanians might have sold him a bill of goods. For example, he cited Romania's "policy of nonalignment with either of the great blocs" and spoke of the pride Romanians feel in being free and independent. He pointed to the civic action role of the Romanian army, including its participation in the political and economic national life, and observed that twenty senior officers are members of the Romanian parliament. He described the Romanian army as a disciplined force and example for the society.

Fabiao's comments reflect both ignorance of Romanian policies and naivete. Bucharest has made

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
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a concerted effort to court nonaligned countries and often cites policies designed to identify Romanian views and interests with those of the nonaligned world in order to underscore the degree of independence it has won. In fact, of course, Romania is bound to Moscow's economic and defense system in East Europe.

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